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Abstract
ÿWe investigate how the superiority of the optimal subsidy or tariff in an international
Cournot oligopoly depends on the production technology used in the industry, an interesting
issue that has not been analyzed in the literature. We establish that the welfare superiority of
the optimal subsidy or tariff depends on the relative steepness of the firms’ common marginal
cost curve: when it is relatively steep, tariffs are superior to subsidies in enhancing domestic
welfare, and vice versa. When both instruments are used simultaneously, the tariff
component becomes more important as the marginal cost curve steepens.
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1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years, many countries around the world have opened up their formerly closed 
markets to foreign firms, creating oligopolistic industries served by both domestic and foreign 
firms.  For instance, the Indian automobile market was virtually closed to foreign companies 
until 1990.  Thanks to the recent economic reforms, now domestic automobile manufacturers 
such as Hindustan Motors, Maruti, and Tata compete with various foreign automobile 
manufacturers such as Ford, Hyundai, Kia, and Mercedes. 
Interestingly, at the same time, almost all of these countries are also using various 
strategic trade policies.  For instance, India has imposed a significant import tariff on foreign-
made cars.  In the context of these markets, what are the justifications behind favoring one set of 
policies over another?  This note addresses the issue by comparing the welfare implications of 
two commonly used strategic trade policies, an import tariff and a domestic production subsidy, 
in the context of a market that is served by a quantity-setting oligopoly, consisting of both 
domestic and foreign firms. 
It is well known that under perfect competition, a domestic production subsidy always 
boosts welfare more than an import tariff (Bhagwati, 1971).  If the domestic market is 
imperfectly competitive, however, the comparison is less clear (Eaton and Grossman, 1986; 
Dixit 1988). When the firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition), it is often presumed 
that a domestic production subsidy is superior to an import tariff in enhancing domestic welfare.  
This is because a subsidy tends to correct the source of production distortion that is associated 
with Cournot competition, and thus it is likely to enhance welfare more than an import tariff.  No 
general result, however, is available with respect to increasing marginal costs, which render the 
additional domestic production encouraged by the subsidy more costly. 
The aim of this note is to demonstrate how the superiority of a subsidy or tariff depends 
on the production technology used in the industry, an intriguing question that has not been 
analyzed in trade literature so far.  We establish that the superiority of a subsidy or tariff depends 
on the relative steepness of the marginal cost curves of the firms.  If the marginal cost curve is 
perfectly flat (as with constant marginal cost) or relatively flat, a production subsidy is indeed 
superior to an import tariff in enhancing domestic welfare, because the additional domestic 
output encouraged by the subsidy does not increase marginal cost significantly.  However, if the 
marginal cost curve is relatively steep, the result is reversed; an import tariff yields a higher level 
of welfare than a production subsidy, because domestic output is not increased as much, and 
rather profit-shifting and tariff revenue boost welfare.  Furthermore, when the government 
commits to a combination of tariff and subsidy, we demonstrate that the relative size of the tariff 
in the optimal tariff-subsidy combination grows as the marginal cost curve becomes steeper, 
which is consistent with the findings regarding each instrument when used alone. 
Interestingly, despite a perceived welfare supremacy of a subsidy in a Cournot oligopoly, 
an import tariff remains the more commonly used trade instrument.  Usually, administrative 
difficulties, political constraints, and deadweight losses associated with production subsidies are 
arguments commonly used to explain the use of import tariffs.  This note provides an economic 
justification for using import tariffs based on their ability to enhance domestic welfare when 
marginal costs are increasing significantly. 
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2.  The Model 
 
The basic model we use is similar to that in Brander and Spencer (1984) and Dixit 
(1988).  We consider an international duopoly consisting of one domestic firm and one foreign 
firm,
1 both producing a homogeneous product for the domestic market alone and competing in 
quantities. Demand is represented by the inverse demand function  Q a p - = , where p is the 
market price and Q is the total quantity brought to the market.  Both firms have identical 
technology, given by the cost function 
2
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1 ) ( kq cq F q C + + = . This cost function allows us to 
consider constant marginal cost (k = 0) as well as quadratic cost ( 0 „ k ); since we do not focus 
on entry, we assume F = 0 with no loss of generality.  We also assume zero transportation costs 
for the foreign firm. 
We assume a two-stage game: in stage one, the domestic government credibly commits to 
a trade policy instrument, either a domestic production subsidy, or an import tariff imposed on 
the foreign firm, or both. In stage two, the firms produce their respective profit-maximizing 
quantities given the trade policies determined in stage one. We solve the model by backward 
induction; first we solve for the firms’ optimal production levels in terms of tariffs and/or 
subsidies, and then we solve stage one, where the domestic government takes the firms’ behavior 
into account and determines the optimal trade policy. 
In stage one, the government may commit to a domestic production subsidy s and/or an 
import tariff t.  Thus, given the government policy in stage one, the profit of the domestic firm in 
stage two is given by: 
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where x is the output of the domestic firm; y is the output of the foreign firm, and s is the subsidy 
provided to the domestic firm per unit of output. 
Similarly, the profit of the foreign firm is given by: 
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where t is the tariff imposed by the domestic government on imports from the foreign firm. 
We solve the first-order conditions for each firm, resulting in the equilibrium quantities 
produced by the firms in terms of the given levels of subsidy and tariff: 
 
,
) 3 )( 1 (




+ + + + -
=
k k
t k s k c a
t s x               (3) 
 
.
) 3 )( 1 (




+ - - + -
=
k k
k t s k c a
t s y               (4) 
 
In stage one, the government’s objective is to choose the optimal value(s) of s and/or t to 
maximize domestic welfare: 
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3.  Comparing Optimal Subsidy and Tariff 
 
First, we examine the scenario in which the government chooses either a subsidy or a 
tariff, but not both.  We will show that while a production subsidy is optimal for a relatively flat 
marginal cost curve, an import tariff is optimal if the marginal cost curve is steep. 
When the government chooses a subsidy, we exogenously set t = 0.  Substituting x and y 
from equations (3) and (4) into the welfare expression (5), and maximizing with respect to s, we 
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Substituting s* into equations (3) and (4), we derive the firms’ second stage equilibrium 
quantities.
2  Furthermore, substituting the second stage equilibrium quantities into equation (5), 
we derive the level of welfare obtained under the optimal subsidy: 
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Next, we repeat the analysis above, but in the context of a tariff rather than a subsidy. 
When the government commits to a tariff alone, we exogenously set s = 0, and maximize 
welfare, based on the output expressions in (3) and (4), with respect to t.  The resulting optimal 
tariff and the resulting level of welfare are: 
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Finally, we compare the two levels of welfare to determine whether welfare is higher 
under a subsidy or a tariff: 
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The only ambiguously signed term in (10) is the final term in the numerator, which is positive if  
) 1 13 ( 2
1 - > k , or approximately 1.30, and negative otherwise.  Therefore, if marginal cost is 
constant (k = 0), then W
t<W
s, verifying the welfare supremacy of subsidy in this case.  More 
                                                                 
2   All expressions and calculations are available from the author.   4
generally, the optimal subsidy yields a higher welfare as long as k is relatively small, or the 
marginal cost curve is relatively flat.  When k is relatively large, however, the result reverses, 
and the optimal tariff provides more welfare than does the optimal subsidy.  Therefore, contrary 
to common belief, the optimal tariff provides higher welfare than the optimal subsidy if the 
marginal cost curve is relatively steep. 
The comparison of welfare under each trade instrument is presented in the proposition 
below. 
 
Proposition 1: In an international duopoly in which both firms produce for the domestic market, 
and the domestic government chooses between an import tariff and a domestic production 
subsidy, welfare is higher under the import tariff (production subsidy) if the firms’ marginal cost 
curve is relatively steep (flat). 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. Both an import tariff and a domestic 
production subsidy have two effects: they encourage domestic production and discourage 
imports. The primary effect of an import tariff is to discourage imports and the secondary effect 
is to encourage domestic production. On the other hand, the primary effect of a domestic 
production subsidy is to stimulate domestic output and the secondary effect is to discourage 
imports.  If k is large (the marginal cost curve is steep), the additional domestic output 
encouraged by a subsidy would be costly, whereas an import tariff boosts the domestic firm’s 
profits while lowering its marginal (and total) cost.  On the other hand, if k is small (the marginal 
cost curve is flat), domestic production is less costly, and welfare can be better enhanced with a 




4.  The Optimal Combination of Subsidies and Tariffs 
 
We now analyze the scenario in which the government commits to a combination of a 
production subsidy and an import tariff in the first stage. This enables us to study the effect of 
the slope of the marginal cost curve on the relative weight of the tariff in the optimal tariff-
subsidy combination. 
Substituting x and y from equations (3) and (4) into welfare (5), and maximizing W with 
respect to both s and t, we derive the optimal subsidy and tariff: 
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Note that  , 2
* * k s t = implying that in the optimal tariff-subsidy combination, the relative 
importance of the tariff grows as the marginal cost curve steepens. Also, for all k > 0, the optimal 
tariff is strictly positive; only when k = 0 is the optimal tariff equal to zero.  Thus, for constant 
marginal cost, we get back the welfare supremacy of a domestic production subsidy alone, even 
                                                                 
3   As mentioned above, the general results of this model hold when the number of firms in each country.  
Unfortunately, the expressions become too complex to assess the effect of the numbers of firms on the critical value 
of k that separates the domains of the optimal subsidy and tariff.   5
when a tariff is available, but otherwise, a combination of both is optimal, and the balance 
between them conforms to the intuition governing their separate use. 
The following proposition follows from the above discussions. 
 
Proposition 2: When the government commits to a combination of production subsidy and 
import tariff, the optimal tariff is zero if the marginal cost curve is perfectly flat and is positive 
otherwise, the relative size of the tariff in the optimal tariff-subsidy combination increasing as 
the marginal cost curve steepens. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
We compare the welfare implications of two commonly used strategic trade policies, an 
import tariff and a domestic production subsidy, in the context of a quantity-setting oligopoly 
consisting of both domestic and foreign firms.  Recent open door policies in many countries 
makes such an undertaking relevant.  We demonstrate how the superiority of a subsidy or tariff 
depends on the production technology used in the industry; an interesting issue that has not been 
analyzed in the literature. 
We establish that the welfare superiority of a tariff or subsidy depends on the relative 
steepness of the marginal cost curve.  When the marginal cost curve is relatively steep, import 
tariffs are superior to production subsidies in enhancing domestic welfare.  Production subsidies 
are superior only when the marginal cost curve is relatively flat.  Indeed, for constant marginal 
cost, we confirm the welfare superiority of subsidies.  Furthermore, when the marginal cost 
curve is increasing, welfare is higher when tariffs and subsidies are used together than either is 
used by itself.  More importantly, we demonstrate that the relative importance of the tariff in the 
optimal tariff-subsidy combination grows as the marginal cost curve becomes steeper. 
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